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Abstract 
Theresa May’s claim that ‘Brexit means Brexit' demonstrates the malleability of the concept. The 
referendum campaign showed that ‘Brexit’ can be articulated to a variety of post-Brexit scenarios. 
While it is important to analyse how Brexit gives rise to contestation in the UK, Brexit is also 
constructed from the outside. Brexit signifies more than the technical complexities of the UK 
withdrawing from the European Union. It works both as a promise of a different future and 
performatively to establish a particular past. Brexit works as a frame with potential to shape 
perceptions in three domains. The first is identity. How does ‘Brexit' shape national and European 
identities in distinct national environments? The second is how Brexit shapes understandings of 
geopolitical reality and influences conceptions of what is diplomatically possible. Third is the 
global economy. How does ‘Brexit' work within intersubjective frames about the nature of global 
economic order?  
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Introduction 
Theresa May’s claim that ‘Brexit means Brexit' demonstrates the malleability of the concept. 
The referendum campaign and its aftermath show that the idea of ‘Brexit’ can be applied to a 
variety of imagined post-Brexit scenarios. In the UK, the lack of a formulated plan by the UK 
government has resulted in ongoing debates and uncertainty over possibilities ranging from ‘hard’ 
Brexit to ‘soft’ Brexit (Wallace, 2016: 814). While it is important to analyse how rival imaginings 
give rise to particular forms of political contestation in the UK, it is also the case that Brexit is 
constructed and imagined from the outside. This article explores how Brexit has been interpreted 
outside of the UK, operating as a signifier with symbolic value.  
Understanding how Brexit is imagined outside the UK is important for three reasons. Firstly, 
it helps to construct identities that lend support for particular political projects. At times of crisis, 
political actors seek to make sense of events by evoking existing identities that resonate in their 
respective national contexts. Crises can therefore reflect identity discourses (Galpin, 2017). 
External perceptions of Brexit can contribute to shaping British identities. Within the EU, pan-
European and national debates not only construct particular national stereotypes, but also shape 
domestic ideas about a European hierarchy of states (Adler-Nissen, 2017). Brexit has been also 
been considered a result of a new international cleavage between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘nationals’ 
(Delanty 2017: 112) that shapes attitudes to European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
Secondly, outside constructions of Brexit are linked to the negotiating positions of the UK’s 
external partners. The UK government has focused on a ‘global Britain’ that trades freely with the 
world (May, 2017). Brexit thus presents a challenge to the UK’s diplomatic relations, requiring new 
multilateral and bilateral agreements with international partners (Glencross, 2016:48). A key 
question for the UK government will therefore be how its negotiating partners respond to its 
demands (Wallace, 2016: 814) and the extent to which outside perceptions match with its objectives 
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or destabilise British self-understandings. To lead in foreign policy a country ‘also has to be 
constructed as a leader by the actors in its negotiation environment’ (Elgström 2007: 952). How the 
UK’s international partners perceive their relationship thus becomes key as Brexit negotiations 
proceed. 
Thirdly, Brexit can be considered not just a UK phenomenon, but part of wider European and 
global populist backlash against globalisation (Calhoun, 2017; O’Rourke, 2016) and the decline of 
democratic capitalism (Streeck, 2014; Rosamond, 2017; Delanty, 2017). The considerable political 
and academic attention to the possibility of ‘contagion’ to other member states with significant 
Eurosceptic movements has led to calls for a theory of European disintegration (Rosamond, 2016). 
Brexit can thus be placed in the context of wider nature of the global political economy. On this 
basis, this article investigates what Brexit signifies outside of the UK in these three overlapping 
domains: identity, diplomacy and global political economy. 
 The article is divided into four sections. The first develops a theoretical framework of 
performativity to analyse how the discourse of Brexit creates that which it purports to describe, 
promising actions and constructing identities. This approach points us to the way in which Brexit 
can be taken to mean a variety of things across domains, countries and time. The second section 
examines the role Brexit plays in how German actors construct national and European identities and 
how it relates to questions of sovereignty. The third section analyses how Brexit shapes 
understandings of geopolitical reality and feeds into conceptions of what is diplomatically possible 
at the global level. The fourth section focuses on how far ‘Brexit’ works within competing 
intersubjective frames about the nature of global economic order. 
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1.  A Performative Theory of Brexit: Promising a Future and Constructing a 
Past  
Theoretically, we are interested in understanding Brexit in performative terms. Accordingly, 
speaking about Europe is not a matter of simply describing the EU, but, as Diez argues, ‘tak[ing] 
part in the construction of the polity itself’ (1999: 599). Speaking about Brexit does not simply 
describe a given reality; it also constructs it. The performance aspect of Brexit takes two overall 
forms: it promises a particular future and it constructs a past. Here we draw on insights from J.L. 
Austin and Judith Butler. To understand how Brexit works as a promise, Austin’s speech act theory 
helps us understand the performative speech act, most prominently, by Theresa May: ‘Brexit means 
Brexit and we’re going to make a success out of it’. In the Butlerian understanding, the discourse of 
Brexit does not express some ‘true’ nature of British identity, geopolitics or economy. Rather, it 
creates that which it seems to represent: namely, a post-Brexit Britain and post-Brexit world – and 
in doing so it also constructs a particular past. Overall, understanding Brexit as performative 
assumes that the very language of Brexit does something politically.  
 
Brexit as a performative speech-act 
Following speech act theory, performative utterances are sentences that not only describe a 
given reality, but also change the social reality they are describing. J.L. Austin (1962: 5) argued 
against a claim that utterances always ‘describe’ or ‘report’ something, which he calls ‘constatives’. 
In contrast, he wrote, there are performatives,  utterances that are not true or false, and that are a 
part of the doing or promising of a certain kind of action. Austin’s famous example is from the 
marriage ceremony: ‘I do’ (take this man to be my lawful wedded husband) . In our case, Theresa 
May made a promise of success: ‘Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a success out of it’.   
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Some speech-acts are written into international treaties, whereas others create a moral obligation 
(Fierke and Wiener, 1999) or an existential threat requiring immediate action (Buzan et al 1998: 
27). The meaning of a speech act is largely determined by its specific context, as the same sentence 
can have different meanings with different audiences (Fierke and Wiener, 1999: 727). Integral to a 
speech act is the intention of the speaker to take action through language (Diez, 1999: 601).  In the 
case of Brexit, Theresa May’s speech act may be intended to gather political support for the UK 
government, reassure the population or inform international partners about national intentions. A 
speech act also requires an audience, where context is key: ‘we’re going to make a success of it’ 
would mean something very different in the German or French context, where interests may lie in 
protecting the European economy or limiting the success of domestic Eurosceptic parties. The key 
analytical question emerging from this understanding of Brexit as a speech-act is: What kind of 
promise for the future does Brexit hold outside the UK, across the three domains we are looking at?  
 
Brexit as performative 
 In contrast to Austin, Judith Butler argues that all speech acts are performative, serving to 
define identity. Performativity is ‘that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that 
it regulates and constrains’ (1993: xii). The concept places emphasis on the manners by which 
identity is brought to life through discourse. Just as with Austin, the performative element of her 
theory suggests a social audience. For Butler, the ‘script’ of gender performance – what is seen as 
appropriate for men and women – is transmitted from generation to generation in the form of 
socially established meanings that are reproduced and internalized.  
In performing Brexit, then, actors perform identities, while ‘constrained by cultural and 
historical practices’ (Zaiotti, 2011: 543). Applied to international relations, Butler’s approach views 
the identity of the state as constituted through discursive practices over time (Campbell, 1998:10). 
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As with gender, such performances of state identity inevitably involve the construction of 
difference, of an ‘Other’. Central to this idea is the construction of boundaries which ‘serve to 
demarcate an “inside” from an “outside”, a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”’ 
(Campbell, 1998: 9). Therefore, performativity in politics is also linked to constituting in- and out-
groups.  
Nevertheless, while for Butler, social orders as reproduced through repeated performances 
constitute subjects, they do not determine them (1988: 526). There is always the possibility of 
agency: more precisely, ways of acting out within the system in ways that are subversive or 
transformative of it (such as drag, cross-dressing and other queer forms of identity that produce new 
possible ways of being in society). The way out of the performative trap is therefore resignification 
– practices that have the effect of changing the meaning of words. So here the analytical question is: 
How is Brexit being ‘scripted’, embedded in pre-existing discourses about what the UK and EU’s 
past has been (and how Brexit is being subverted). 
Below we examine both how Brexit functions as a promise of a future and how it is being 
‘scripted’, embedded in pre-existing discourses, thereby helping to produce certain identities and 
particular pasts. 
 
2. Brexit and National and European Identities 
This section provides some illustrative examples of the performative role of Brexit in constructing 
European and national identities primarily from the German context. As Brexit negotiations 
proceed, political leaders in the EU need to be responsive to public opinion in their own national 
contexts, particularly those countries such as Germany and France with national elections taking 
place in 2017. As a key actor in Brexit negotiations, German public opinion about Brexit is 
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particularly relevant. Here we focus on two main issues: representations of the other (the UK) and 
representations of the self (the nation-state and Europe). 
 
Post-Brexit Britain seen from the outside 
Brexit serves to (re-)construct external images of the UK that are embedded in pre-existing, and 
often competing discourses. Interestingly, Brexit is either constructed as a break with or 
continuation of the past, thereby either naturalising the image of an open, pragmatic and trustworthy 
partner in Europe or naturalising a British identity as the ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1994) and a 
‘stranger in Europe’ (Wall, 2008). This binary reflects an ongoing conflict between conceptions of 
the UK as a European country, which Churchill envisaged, and British exceptionalism rooted in the 
history of the British Empire (Delanty, 2017).  
 In German media coverage, one general position suggests that Brexit signifies a departure 
from the traditions of a nation that is viewed as an integral part of Europe. This portrait represents 
for Britain a loss of the cosmopolitan, Cool Britannia image popularised in the 1990s (Calhoun, 
2017: 63). Brexit highlights a perceived mismatch between how the British have previously been 
understood and what Brexit represents for them now. For example, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ) describes the Brexit vision as a ‘rejection of the island’s self-confident, liberal 
cosmopolitanism’ (Schipper 2016: 34). Along the same lines, Süddeutsche Zeitung notes that the 
‘supposedly deeply-rooted British virtues such as soberness and pragmatism made way for hysteria 
and xenophobic narrow-mindedness’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016: 41). Here, Brexit thus defines not 
just what the UK is understood to have represented in the past, nor what post-Brexit Britain 
promises to be, but also reiterates what values are important in this German context: 
cosmopolitanism, tolerance and pragmatism.  
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A second major position, however, understands Brexit as a continuation of the ‘national myth 
of British exceptionalism’ (Gamble, 2012: 473). Some articles give rise to constructions of the UK 
as a country that has always been different. Sometimes they highlight the UK’s strong tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty. FAZ, for example, discusses a British attitude ‘that they should not be 
led by an elite or be told by foreigners what to do’ (Thomas 2016: 9). Alongside this caricature, 
many articles describe the British mentality as resting on the historical experience of empire, where 
Europe is constructed as Britain’s ‘Other’ (Gifford, 2006). For example, one describes a nostalgic 
middle England that ‘wishes the old England back, an England that possessed a global Empire’ 
(Lapido 2016:a 5). Also in response to May’s speech, Die Welt Kompakt published a front-page 
story: ‘Little Britain: Prime Minister Theresa May is leading Britain into isolation’ (Die Welt 
Kompakt, 19 January 2017). In a Butlerian sense, Brexit thus signifies a continuation of the past; it 
is a uniquely British phenomenon, a function of its particular historical experience.  
These images also reveal a high level of cultural knowledge about the UK, particularly its 
imperial history but also popular culture, that is unlikely to be matched by British knowledge of 
Germany. British (Eurosceptic) media representations of Germany primarily invoke the Nazi past 
(Anderson and Weymouth, 1999), also reflected in the referendum debate when, for example, Boris 
Johnson claimed that the EU is comparable to Nazi Germany with ‘different methods’ (Ross, 2016). 
Thus, we can see a starkly asymmetric relationship between the UK and other EU member states. It 
also presents British exceptionalism and the British empire – colonialism – as the antithesis of 
European integration. As such, Brexit is scripted into a particular ‘European’ political culture – 
consensus-oriented, cosmopolitan, and based on the sharing of sovereignty. In some cases, Brexit 
represents a shift in perception of what Britishness means abroad, defining Brexit and post-Brexit 
Britain as based on irrationality and intolerance. In other cases, it serves fundamentally to 
differentiate Britishness from Europe. 
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 Britain as the Other: Constructions of Europe and the nation-state 
Secondly, Brexit provokes public constructions of Europe and the nation-state, embedded in 
discourses on what it means to be European. (Risse, 2010). In the case of Germany, Brexit is 
embedded in particular discourses about European integration. On the one hand, Brexit highlights 
Germany’s multiple European/national identities and serves in the debate as a justification for the 
continued sharing of sovereignty, a reminder of Europe’s role in constraining German power 
(Katzenstein, 1997). Germany’s European identity is thus reproduced against its Nazi past as its 
historical Other (see for example Adler-Nissen, 2017; Galpin, 2017). In a commentary in the FAZ, 
for example, then German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2016) mentions the interwar 
period, warning that ‘if a unified Europe […] breaks apart and falls away, then the odds of a better, 
more peaceful and just world would be much worse’. He argues that Germany seeks not to be the 
dominant power, but to work closely with its neighbours and in so doing ‘show our particular 
historical experiences’ (Steinmeier, 2016). 
 However, Brexit is also embedded in competing ideas about European identities and often 
serve to oppose further integration. In the German discourse, Brexit reproduces new divisions in 
Europe through constructions of Northern Europe in contrast to the ‘South’, based upon Germany’s 
conception of a Europe true to Germany’s ‘ordoliberal’ economic model (Galpin, 2017) – a form of 
neoliberalism based on free markets enforced by rules of the state (see also Nedergaard and Snaith, 
2015). FAZ, for example, writes that Brexit will shift voting weights ‘in favour of countries that 
tend to support redistribution and protectionism – that is, towards the south’ (Kafsack, 2016). 
Britain is constructed as part of a ‘Northern Europe’ that stands for ‘economic discipline’ and 
opposes Europe-wide redistributive policies. This construction also brings to the fore a clear 
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paradox of Brexit, in which the British debate largely ignored Britain’s role in shaping the EU’s 
liberal economic agenda, while that role clearly is acknowledged outside the UK.  
 This acknowledgement gives rise to an emphasis on the importance of the German-British 
relationship. For example, one article in Die Welt notes that ‘the scepticism of the Brits, their non-
conformism and their liberalism were always the motor of Europe ... Today it needs a German-
British axis’ (Seibel, 2013: 1). Such calls for a close relationship contrast strongly with 
representations in the British debate that place Germany in the weaker position dependent on 
British trade (Dominiczak, 2016). Within the EU, many other states emphasise a close partnership 
with the UK. In the Netherlands, for instance, Anne Mulder from the ruling People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy (VVD), noted that it ‘will have major consequences for the European 
economy and the geopolitical balance. The Netherlands is losing an important ally in Brussels 
negotiations’ (Dutch News.nl, 2016). 
Furthermore, Brexit is also used by those opposing deeper political union or who criticise the 
EU’s democratic deficit, themes embedded in communitarian or nationalist discourses. FAZ cites an 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) regional party leader, Björn Höcke, who states that the Brits ‘have 
left the path of collective insanity and decided in favour of democracy and national sovereignty’. 
Federal spokesperson Alexander Gauland also blames Angela Merkel for Brexit, arguing that she 
‘has driven Britain out of the European Union with her open borders’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 2016), thus embedding Brexit into national debates about immigration and refugees.  
Brexit can therefore be considered performative in the Butlerian sense: it reproduces pre-
existing notions of British, European and national identities, and also highlights divisions between 
cosmopolitan and communitarian identities. However, it is also a powerful speech-act outside the 
UK, promising a new, more stable future or the beginning of a new world order. 
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3. Brexit, Diplomacy and Geopolitics 
When it comes to geopolitical imaginaries and conceptions of what is diplomatically possible,  
Brexit has led to a range of different interpretations across the world. Interestingly, many of these 
readings appear to be in contradiction. In the following, we will focus on three illustrative examples 
of the diplomatic promise of Brexit: multilateralism (liberal world order, security communities), 
post-imperialism (Commonwealth, Anglosphere) and bilateralism (special relationships, 
partnerships and ‘gateways’). The examples illustrate that what Brexit means depends not only on 
who you are, but also from where you see it. 
 
Brexit as a threat to multilateralism and the promise of continued European unity 
First, Brexit has given rise to a range of different threats and promises about multilateralism and the 
international liberal order. Such ideas also relate to identity discourses, by emphasising shared 
values and interests, community boundaries and a common threat from an Other. One geopolitical 
discourse portrays Brexit as an existential threat to the Western-dominated liberal world order. 
Beginning with the transatlantic security community, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 
warned against Brexit, saying that ‘a more fragmented Europe would threaten Europe's shared 
security’ (CBC News, 2016). Stoltenberg argued that Brexit signalled more than the UK leaving the 
EU; it created uncertainty about the global order and international cooperation. Interestingly, Japan 
became the most vocal advocate of multilateralism. In a 15-page letter, Japan underlined that it was 
committed to ‘further cooperate with Europe with a view to maintaining the rules-based global 
order’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2016: 2). 
Following the referendum result, US President Obama sought to build a narrative about a 
resilient international order despite Brexit, promising the unifying ability of ‘our shared values, 
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including our commitment to democracy and pluralism and opportunity for all people in a 
globalized world’ (Reilly, 2016; Smith, 2016). China also supported the UK remaining in the EU, 
but this view was articulated as a way of ensuring a strong EU that could counter the US - a vision 
of multipolarity. Ai Jun (2016), writing for the state-owned newspaper Global Times explained:  
A multipolar world requires more powers, which are independent of the US, to 
participate in international governance. The EU is supposed to be one of them. But the 
leverage of a divided Europe is bound to be limited. That's why China wishes to see a 
united and strong EU. 
China’s pro-Remain rhetoric is thus embedded in a discourse about multipolarity, whereas the US’s 
pro-Remain discourse is scripted into a discourse about a liberal, essentially US-led, world order.  
Within the EU, most member states emphasised the resilience of European integration. From 
this perspective, Brexit is a performative speech-act as per Austin: Brexit is a crisis, the EU27 
exists, and it will remain unified. The day after the referendum, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
maintained that ‘only together can we continue to assert our values of freedom, democracy and the 
rule of law and our interests’ (Der Spiegel 2016). This narrative brings the EU27 discursively into 
being prior to the UK’s actual departure – redrawing the boundaries of the EU and reflecting the 
UK’s insider/outsider status (Shackleton, 2016; Adler-Nissen, 2014). Meeting at a summit in 
Bratislava without the UK, the heads of state and government of EU27 promised a stable and 
prosperous future. Echoing May’s promise to make a success of Brexit, the summit’s joint 
declaration stated that: 
In the aftermath of the wars and deep divisions on our continent, the EU secured peace, 
democracy and enabled our countries to prosper […] We are determined to make a 
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success of the EU with 27 Member States, building on this joint history (European 
Council, 2016: 1).  
As part of this narrative, Brexit is constructed as a crisis that will unite the EU27 against a common 
threat. Against this promise, Die Welt argues that Brexit is considered likely to strengthen the 
‘centrifugal forces’ in the EU (Schiltz and Tauber, 2016: 2) as the risk of a Eurosceptic domino 
takes hold. For example, David Cameron, in calling for a referendum to appease his party, is 
considered in Die Welt to have ‘jeopardised the future of a whole continent’(Lapido 2016b: 4) The 
performativity of Brexit, therefore, is not simply about the social construction of subjects. Rather, it 
is a discourse that inscribes boundaries between subjects and reifies them in that very process. 
Taken together, this multilateral discourse promises that the world is – or rather should be – the 
same after the shock of Brexit: governed by binding international rules, democracy and pluralism.  
 
Brexit and the promise of a New World Order 
The election of US President Donald Trump challenged the discourse of a continued liberal world 
order. Trump argued that Brexit marked the beginning – or indeed the promise – of a new world 
order based on national independence and identities. Here, a Europe of sovereign nations is 
discursively constructed against a common threat – Brussels. Trump interpreted Brexit as a parallel 
to his own election: ‘People want to take their country back. They want to have independence in a 
sense. […]And it is happening in the United States’ (quoted in MacAskill, 2016). In France, Front 
National’s Marine Le Pen shared this interpretation. For Le Pen, Brexit was: ‘the beginning of the 
end of the European Union. And I hope the birth of the Europe of nations, a Europe of cooperation 
that we’ve been propounding for years’.  
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In the Netherlands, before his sound defeat in the Dutch parliamentary elections in March 
2017, Geert Wilders (2016), leader of the Freedom Party (PVV) argued that Brexit was only the 
beginning of a ‘Europe’s Patriot Spring’. Also for Germany’s AfD, Brexit promised a new 
European future. The day after the referendum, party leader Frauke Petry declared that ‘the time is 
ripe for a new Europe, for a Europe of the fatherlands (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Thus, 
amongst Brexit’s international supporters, Brexit constitutes the promise of a different future, and a 
different world order. 
 
Subversive post-imperial imaginaries 
Second, Brexit gives rise to a range of post-imperial associations, not just within the UK, but also in 
former British colonies. One of important idea during the referendum campaign was that Brexit 
would reignite ‘the Commonwealth’ (Chabe 2016). Brexit is thus embedded in identity discourses 
helping to (re)constitute the UK as an empire, but also reminds former colonies of the nature of 
their relations to London. However, rather than consolidating the promise of a successful Brexit, 
based on its imperial past, many post-imperial associations outside the UK subvert this very 
discourse.  
 Prior to the referendum, the message from the 53-members of Commonwealth was that the 
UK should remain a member of the EU. As Patricia Scotland, Commonwealth Secretary-General, 
explained, ’the Commonwealth does not set itself up in competition with Europe - we are partners’ 
(James 2016). Speaking directly to the Commonwealth agenda, Director of the African Growth 
Initiative at Brookings Institute Amadou Sy and research assistant Mariama Sow claimed that 
Brexit would mean ‘reduced British outwardness when it comes to global development issues, as 
well as decreased bilateral development assistance and trade’ (Sy and Sow, 2016). Several 
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Commonwealth countries, including Australia, New Zealand and India, expressed interest (in 
principle) in free trade deals, but demanded easier migration from these countries into the UK than  
currently permitted (Onslow, 2016). When Theresa May visited India to discuss a post-Brexit trade 
deal, Indian diplomats discussed Brexit as an opportunity to improve the ‘human dimension of the 
relationship with the UK’, and specifically the visa issue. This discourse from key Commonwealth 
countries thus subverts a core argument in the Leave-campaign: namely, that Brexit would help to 
control migration into the UK.  
A more curious connection between Brexit and British (post-)imperialism can be found in the 
Iranian response to Brexit. The deputy chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, Massoud Jazayeri states 
‘England should pay the price of years of imperialism and committing crimes against humanity,’ 
explaining that the price would be Scotland and other parts of the UK demanding independence 
(Borger and Wintour 2016). This Iranian discourse is not only subversive of the dominant Brexit 
discourse. It also involves a resignification of the imperial past, where the British empire is 
constituted not in the discourse of a visionary and ‘truly global’ Britain, but is portrayed in terms of 
domestic tensions and identity conflicts within its imperial core. From a queer perspective, by 
bringing such identity mismatches into light, external interpretations of Brexit may have subversive 
effects on British identities. 
 
Brexit and the many special relationships 
Third, Brexit has revealed that a very large number of states appear to have some sort of ‘special 
relationship’ with the UK. Here, Brexit is clearly performative in the Austinian tradition, promising 
the continuation of bilateral relationships. Beginning with the ‘special relationship’ par excellence, 
that of the US, Obama promised that ‘the United Kingdom’s membership in NATO remains a vital 
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cornerstone of US foreign, security, and economic policy’ and Vice-President Joe Biden 
highlighted the long-standing US-UK relationship, promising that ‘that very special bond will 
endure’ (quoted in Berensen, 2016). 
Another related metaphor for bilateral diplomatic relations with the UK is that of ‘gateway’, 
with a range of countries describing the UK as their closest allies in the EU. Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe stated that ‘Japan attaches importance to our relationship with the UK as a gateway to 
the European Union’ (quoted in Stewart, 2016). Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
explained that he hoped that the UK would remain in the EU as it was India’s ‘gateway to Europe’ 
(McLain, 2016). Similarly, Turkey’s ambassador to the EU, Selim Yenel, emphasized that Brexit 
might have consequences for the EU’s ability to deliver promises to Turkey, as the UK is ‘one of 
[Ankara’s] biggest backers in the EU’ (quoted in Peker 2016).  
Perhaps most interestingly, before the referendum, in October 2015, China officially stated 
that that the UK could help promote the development of strong China-EU relations. As China’s Xi 
Jinping explained to the UK Prime Minister, China ‘hopes Britain, as an important member of the 
EU, can play an even more positive and constructive role in promoting the deepening development 
of China-EU ties’ (quoted in Bounds, 2016). China’s position was not linked to protecting values or 
ensuring support for multilateral cooperation. Instead, what Obama and Xi have in common was 
that they both saw the UK as their economic and political ‘gateway’ into the EU. In contrast, 
several African leaders reacted more pragmatically, many predicting that Brexit would have limited 
impact on their bilateral relations. However, the President of Nigeria hinted at his country’s 
dissatisfaction with the result, saying that he hoped the West African country could enjoy ‘greater 
cooperation and consolidation of shared interests’ with the UK ‘despite the outcome of the 
referendum’. (quoted in Gaffey 2016) 
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In sum, in terms of bilateralism, the UK is at the same time the closest trading partner for 
Japan, ensures good China-EU relations, defends Turkish interests in the EU, discloses security 
information to the US and all the Commonwealth countries have special partnerships with UK. 
These stories about ‘special relationships’ – although substantively often very far from the 
arguments of Leave campaign – might help explain why many British voters felt safe in believing 
the promise that the UK would be a ‘truly global Britain’ outside the EU. 
 
4. Brexit and the Global Economy 
The eventual withdrawal from the EU of one of the world’s largest economies will have global 
repercussions. We focus here on the ways in which Brexit has shaped competing subjective visions 
of the global economy. Brexit has been embedded in discourses about the global economic order 
that, similarly to discourses on identity and the geopolitical world order, reflect a international vs. 
nativist cleavage. The insertion of ‘Brexit’ into these discourses has revealed some intriguing 
paradoxes within (particularly) conservative discourses on the global economy.      
Within economic thought there is a traditional division between liberalism and economic 
nationalism. Economic liberals tend to advocate the advance of market society and the minimisation 
of the interventionist reach of government. Economic nationalists premise economic justice on 
whatever is best for the nation at any given time. Economic liberalism has been associated with the 
recent period of globalisation in the world economy, while the rise of economic nationalism has 
often been associated with retreats from globalisation.   
A good deal of evidence suggests that the vote for Brexit – as well as the election of Donald 
Trump to the US presidency – was associated with a backlash against globalisation (see also Blyth, 
2016; Wilson, 2017). Withdrawal from the EU under the mantra of ‘taking back control’ implies a 
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victory for a form of economic nationalism. Yet the pro-Brexit coalition involved not only nativists 
mobilising the ‘losers of globalisation’ around an anti-immigration message but also hyper-liberals 
who understood the EU to be a regulatory impediment to the delivery of a truly free market order 
(Finlayson, 2016). One of the most interesting features of Brexit is thus this coalition between two 
largely antithetical positions often seen as ideological rivals (Zürn and de Wilde, 2016).  
The cleavage between these nativist and globalist political economy positions is also highly 
prominent in external meaning making around ‘Brexit’. The focus here is on claims about how the 
UK’s departure from the EU should reshape the ordering principles of the global economy and how, 
in turn, these visions confirm pre-exisiting normative claims about economic order.  
The relationship between the UK and the global economy brings to mind Winston Churchill’s 
view of the country at the intersection of three great circles of external relations: the British 
Commonwealth and Empire, the sphere of transatlantic relations and the English-speaking 
dominions, and the soon to be united Europe. Thinking retrospectively, the three circles metaphor 
has been used to capture the defining dilemma of British foreign policy since 1945 (Sanders and 
Houghton, 2016; Gamble, 2005). The three circles can be seen as rival economic spaces, 
embodying alternative value sets and philosophies of political economy. Here we sample varieties 
of each discourse as they apply to each of the ‘three circles’.  
 
A new transatlantic economic space?  
‘Transatlantic’ has two distinct meanings in post-Brexit discourse. First, for some actors, the term 
‘transatlantic economy’ describes the progressive integration of the US and EU economies. This 
process is one of market making and liberalisation (as exemplified by the proposed Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership agreement), and is inclusive of all component EU member-state 
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economies. Thus the Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC - an association of around 70 US and 
European multi-national corporations) sees Brexit as potentially disruptive of the existing 
transatlantic economic order. The TABC sees the EU’s single market as providing ‘predictable, 
common regulatory framework’, whereas Brexit ‘introduces substantial levels of legal, commercial 
and economic uncertainty’ (TABC 2016: 1). One fear is that Brexit will deprive the EU of its most 
forceful advocate of economic liberalism and free trade (Jackson et al 2016: 2). Advocates of this 
position regard the maintenance of a transatlantic liberal order as crucial to resisting the rise of new 
potential hegemons such as China individually or the BRICS collectively (Duina, 2016). Thus the 
risks posed by Brexit have broader geo-economic implications for the sustainability of the 
neoliberal project.  
 
The TABC advocates an arrangement between the UK and the EU27 that disturbs as little as 
possible the existing benefits of the single market. Put into the terms laid out above, this position – 
effectively ruled out by the UK government – envisages clear benefits of maintaining a North 
Atlantic liberal economic space, within which the jurisdictionally separate US, EU and post-Brexit 
UK economies would continue a relatively seamless integrative path. This version of the 
transatlantic economy is premised on long established practices that have shaped and naturalised the 
US-EU economic relationship into this particular conception. What critical scholars have long seen 
as the emergence of a transatlantic neoliberal order (Gill, 2016; Cafruny and Ryner, 2017) can be 
read in our terms as a Butlerian form of performativity.  
 
 The second conception of the transatlantic economy works from a different geographical 
premise. Here the key spatial parameters of that economy are Anglo-American rather than Euro-
American. By implication, the Anglo-American economic space would find itself in a competitive 
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relationship with the European economy. In one prominent guise, this emergent form of 
conservatism presents itself as a revived version of the purest form of nineteenth century economic 
liberalism. As the American writer Kevin Richardson (2017) puts it: ‘the argument for free trade 
contains within it practically the whole of conservative economic thinking and a great deal of 
conservative thinking beyond economics’. Richardson’s essay reflects on inter-alia the award of a 
major prize by the National Review Institute to the British Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan for 
his role in persuading the UK to leave the EU. Hannan – like other key figures behind the ‘Leave’ 
campaign – presents himself as an old style free-marketeer, keen to reassert the virtues of minimal 
state intervention, low levels of regulation, and tax cuts (Hannan, 2017a). 
 
This version of transatlanticism portrays the EU not as an agent for the propagation of free 
markets, but rather as an interventionist bulwark that prevents the realization of market society. The 
delivery of Brexit becomes the means to protect core economic liberal values. But the very act of 
announcing ‘Brexit’ is an assertion, in an Austinian sense, of the idea of Anglo-American economic 
liberalism. Writing for the free market think tank the Cato Institute, Hannan compares Brexit with 
the American revolution: ‘all the grievances that animated your patriot leaders apply equally to us. 
Let me put it even more simply: you guys voted Leave in 1776’ (Hannan, 2017b: 2). His piece 
drops the names of multiple conservative and free market thinkers and purports to offer an ethical 
case for free markets. It is an Anglo-American vision of political economy performed across policy-
facing platforms.  
 
Richardson and Hannan make it clear that their version of future economic order would stand 
in opposition to the economic nationalist orientation of the newly elected US President Donald 
Trump. Richardson makes this point especially clear, seeing it as ‘incompatible with a politics 
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based on property rights, individual liberty, and the traditional moral and social order’ (Williamson, 
2017). Needless to say, this argument raises a paradox for conservative economic liberals who 
articulate an Anglospheric version of economic freedom. Both the advance of Brexit and the 
Republican successes in the 2016 US elections relied heavily upon the mobilisation of nativist (and 
thus economic nationalist) sentiment among voting publics. US economic liberals thus face the 
paradox of securing political power with the support of constituencies whose understanding of 
economic priorities is zero sum and ‘America first’ in orientation (Hankia, 2017).  
 
Economic nationalist policies might, for a time, be consistent with the maintenance of an 
Anglo-American market order. But, by definition, they can only support such a vision to the extent 
that they serve the perceived economic interests of the US. Meanwhile, the Euro-American 
conception of liberal order is threatened by the types of anti-globalisation backlash that both 
enabled Brexit and brought Trump to power.   
 
Empire 2.0?      
The fate of the Commonwealth ‘circle’ was a matter of significant public debate in the run up to the 
UK joining the European Communities in 1973. The idea of reviving the Commonwealth as a 
vibrant economic space has come back into fashion in the context of Brexit. Membership of the EU 
prevented the UK from partaking in any initiative to create a Commonwealth free trade area, an 
idea that has now re-emerged, even if some Whitehall officials have dubbed it (disparagingly) 
‘Empire 2.0’ (Financial Times, 7 March 2017).  
Some of the loudest voices advocating the construction of a new Commonwealth economic 
space have emerged from Australia. In objective terms, it is clear that Australia is an Asia-Pacific 
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economy. Only 1.4 per cent of Australian exports go to the UK and 1.3 per cent of UK exports flow 
in the opposite direction (Parris, 2017; Evans, 2016). Nevertheless, former Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott welcomed Brexit as liberation from the ‘statism and bureaucracy of Brussels’ 
(Cleverly and Hewish 2016: 4) and laid out a clear vision of what the post-Brexit relationship 
between the UK and Australia should look like:  
The movement of goods between our two countries should be absolutely free of tariffs 
or quotas. And each country’s product and service standards should be recognised in the 
other. ... Provided people are coming to work rather than to take advantage of social 
security or health services, Australians should also be free to live in the UK and vice 
versa (Cleverly and Hewish 2016: 4-5).  
Here Abbott transplants the basic operating principles of the EU single market to an imagined 
future economic relationship between the UK and Australia. This view resembles the second 
(Anglo-American) version of transatlanticism noted above: an affirmation of faith in economic 
liberal principles combined with a critique of the EU as an impediment to open and free markets. 
As Wellings (2016) notes, there is a tradition of Eurosceptic discourse in Australia. Its advocates 
tend to portray the EU as illiberal, but they also form part of a broader cultural politics of the right 
that unites politicians across the Anglosphere. Once again Brexit seems to have emboldened two 
types of sentiment: market liberalism (with an Anglosphere twist) and ‘Australia First’ nativism 
(McDougall, 2016). The upshot (and the unifying thread) is a political economy nostalgia for a 
return to a pre-1973 version of the Commonwealth where economic relations between the ‘white’ 
nations is privileged.  
It should be said that this position remains a marginal (if revealing) strand of discourse – 
even within Australia (Evans 2016). The Commonwealth itself took a pragmatic non-committal 
position on the referendum – even if some of its member states were very vocal that Brexit would 
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have severely negative economic effects for them (The Commonwealth 2016b). This impact is 
particularly true of the many less-developed countries (LDCs) within the Commonwealth, which 
have relied upon EU preferential arrangements to gain access to the UK market. Here we move 
from nostalgic discourses about the revival of the white Anglosphere as a liberal economic space to 
questions that are existential for small developing economies (The Commonwealth 2016a). The 
Commonwealth’s own analysis of post-Brexit trade scenarios acknowledges that the UK 
government is likely to pursue a liberal trade policy, but also fears that Commonwealth interests 
will be crowded out of Article 50 negotiations (Stevens and Kennan, 2016). 
 
It follows that there is no clear imaginary of ‘Empire 2.0’. In fact, the two positions explored 
here are polar opposites. Strikingly, a revival of the pre-1973 Commonwealth economy along 
liberal lines takes little account of the actual patterning of economic relationships that has 
developed since. As Murray-Evans (2016) notes, the complex development of the EU’s 
relationships with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states has significantly reconfigured the 
UK’s own relationships with its former colonies. Moreover, that relationship sits very much within 
an outward projection of European economic space.       
 
A new European economy?  
We have already seen how one influential version of transatlanticism is premised on the 
continuation of US-EU economic space, while key voices in the Commonwealth are keen to 
maintain extant trading relationships with the EU after Brexit. In other words, Brexit is not only an 
opportunity for the radical re-imagination of economic space in an Austinian sense; it has also 
prompted rehearsals of the virtues of prevailing economic configurations in a more Butlerian sense.  
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The ‘European economy’ has always been a potentially contested idea, amenable to a 
variety of political economy value sets (Rosamond, 2012). The progressive ‘neoliberalisation’ of 
the European economy with the UK as a driver is an established theme within EU political 
economy research (see Gill, 2016; De Ville and Orbie, 2014). This theme raises the question of 
whether Brexit creates discursive space for alternative understandings of European economic space 
such as ‘social Europe’. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) deploys the idea of 
‘social Europe’ with some frequency, but so far its focus on Brexit has been on the status of mobile 
citizens in the Article 50 negotiations. Gerhard Bosch – an academic advocate of ‘social Europe’ 
states that: ‘The trade union movement in Europe […] no longer has any convincing plans for 
European reform’ (Bosch, 2017). Social Europe versions of the European economy have loud and 
zealous advocates (Varoufakis, 2017), who deliver powerful Austinian speech acts. But the relative 
absence of organizational support (from, for example, coordinated action by trade unions and 
parties of the centre left) means that Butlerian performance (and thus routinization) of the idea of 
‘social Europe’ is underdeveloped.  
 
More orthodox voices are naturally concerned that existing patterns of economic governance 
are not disturbed by the UK’s withdrawal. Equally, the UK should not be allowed to secure 
competitive advantages over the EU-27 as a result of Brexit. For example, Germany’s Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has been keen to emphasize that, once out of the EU, the UK will still 
be subject to international rules on investment incentives and G20 rules on tax avoidance (Wagstyl 
and Chezan 2016). This way is another in which post-Brexit economic futures are constrained 
discursively. From this viewpoint, escaping the juridical strictures of the EU would not exempt the 
UK from a variety of economic policy obligations. The vision of European regulatory space is one 
where the EU is embedded within a broader international economic space. 
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 Conclusion 
This article has argued for the value of understanding Brexit in performative terms. This perspective 
allows us to invert the default mode of representing Brexit as being driven by particular identity 
concerns in the UK. Instead, we have focused on how Brexit helps provide subject positions to 
countries and organisations around the world, giving them vital importance. As we have shown, 
Brexit is not just a tectonic event for the UK. It also serves to construct other national identities and 
reinforces particular images of bilateral and multilateral relations and the global economy. 
At a global level, the language of Brexit is performative, embedded in pre-existing discourses 
about Britain, Europe and the nation-state as well as the global order, it helps construct particular 
pasts. Brexit, however, also also leads to other often directly opposing, performative speech-acts, 
promising the status quo or a new, prosperous future, not for the UK, but for the rest of the world. 
For instance, Brexit has led to the promise that the EU-27 will remain united and to declarations of 
commitments to multilateralism across the world. For others, Brexit promises a radical shift towards 
a new world order, a new Europe of nation-states as well as the global power shift away from the 
West. At the same time, we have seen how Brexit both reproduces pre-existing conceptions of 
Britishness, as well as longstanding, and often competing, discourses on European and national 
identity. Brexit also divides neoliberals across the world, producing quite different geo-economic 
imaginaries depending on how market liberal ideas are articulated to distinct conceptions of 
economic space.  
In conclusion, while it is important to grasp the changing strategies through which UK 
leaders articulate Brexit and European integration, this task should not come at the expense of 
exploring the many ways through which the rest of the world identifies Brexit as a threat or 
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possibility. From a performative perspective, Brexit does not threaten the EU or the multilateral 
system, per se. Instead, the dangers identified in Brexit serve as foils against which other nation-
states constitute their identities, testifying to the importance of examining the discursive formations 
that enable specific politics. From this perspective, Brexit represents not just choices for the UK or 
Europe, but presents other actors around the world with opportunities to assert their own ontological 
existence. This reality has real-life implications for the UK’s position in the Brexit negotiations. 
Rather than consolidating the promise of a successful Brexit, based on its imperial past and special 
relationships, the many different and competing Brexit imaginaries outside the UK subvert this very 
discourse of success by revealing its inner tensions. Yet, in doing so, Brexit also reveals 
contradictions and cleavages in other nations’ identities and geo-political and economic 
imaginaries. 
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